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Recent decades have witnessed an in-
crease in the number of works dedicated to 
the analysis of effects of historical events on 
the choice of institutions and further econo-
mic and social development of regions. This 
article employs the new institutional econo-
mic theory approach to consider the choices 
regarding title to land and serfdom in Mos-
covy and the Polish — Lithuanian Com-
monwealth (earlier the Grand Duchy of Li-
thuania) in the 16th—17th centuries. The author 
emphasizes the factors, which affected the 
choice of institutional development trajectory, 
and considers the influence exerted by these 
institutes on the political and military devel-
opment of these states. This article shows 
how the contingent property rights in Mosco-
vy turned out to be competitive in the condi-
tions of a considerable contribution of decen-
tralisation factors to defence capacity and, 
opposite to the situation in the Polish — Li-
thuanian Commonwealth, ensured the forma-
tion of large and efficient troops. This work 
contributes to the research on the property 
rights and Russian economic history. 
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The recent decades have witnessed an 
increase in the number of works dedi-
cated to the analysis of the influence of 
historical events on institutional choices 
and further economic and social devel-
opment of regions. This line of research 
is called New Institutional Economic His-
tory, NIEH1. The principal conclusion 
drawn by scholars in the framework of 
                                                     
1 A detailed review of works on NIEH is given in [1; 2].  
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NIEH is that history “matters”. Different exogenous factors (natural re-
sources, climate, legal institutions established in the course of colonization, 
political inequality) relate to the choice of institutions (first of all, the institu-
tion of proprietary rights), which, in their turn affect the economic develop-
ment. 
This work considers from the perspective of the NIEH approach the fea-
tures of the choice of fundamental institutions in Moscovy and the Polish—
Lithuanian Commonwealth (earlier the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in the 
16th—17th centuries, namely the regime of proprietary rights to land and serf-
dom and identifies the factors that affected this choice. Throughout the pe-
riod under consideration, Moscovy and the Polish—Lithuanian Common-
wealth were the key actors on the military and political map of Eastern Eu-
rope and long-standing religious opponents. Alongside the political, military, 
and religious aspects of the competition, one can also speak of the competi-
tion at the institutional level. In this case, the competition is understood not 
as a direct collision of institutions, but their diverse effect on the social and 
political and military spheres leading to different economic and military con-
sequences, and, as a result, to a wider distribution or, on the contrary, aban-
donment of such institutions. 
In the course of the 16th—17th centuries, the institutional choice in the 
states considered was made for two principal markets — those of land and 
labour. The institutional decision was a choice between two alternatives for 
each market: free labour — non-free labour (serfdom) and unconditional 
ownership (patrimonial land tenure) — conditional ownership (manorial 
land tenure). History shows that the choice was different for Moscovy and 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Whereas both states chose non-free 
labour (this choice was affected by several factors), as to the regime of pro-
prietary rights, the choices were opposite: in Moscovy, contingent proprie-
tary rights were widely spread, whereas in the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth, they were replaced by vested ones. These features of institutional 
development require a further explanation, which can be provided through 
an analysis of historical development alternatives. 
 
Serfdom and manorial land tenure as a social contract 
 
From the perspective of an institutional analysis, the establishment of 
serfdom and development of manorial land tenure characteristic, for exam-
ple, of Muscovy can be considered as a conclusion of a tacit social contract 
between the supreme ruler and the nobility. To this effect, the supreme ruler 
restricts proprietary rights to land, undermines the authority of large patri-
monial landowners (monasteries, nobility) and, relying on the interests of a 
different group - manorial land owners - becomes a chief landowner. The in-
troduction of serfdom, which resulted in the restriction of mobility of peas-
ants and establishment of monopsony in the labour market, was a necessary 
step to support landowners as a loyal interest group, which received in the 
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conditions of serfdom the surplus of peasant labour. In return, landowners 
agree to waive certain rights to land and yield the political function, con-
tenting themselves with military and administrative services. 
The social contract will persist (i. e. contingent proprietary rights will do-
minate and serfdom will be established), if it proves to be profitable for the 
mentioned interest groups — the supreme ruler and the nobility. Otherwise, 
the social contract will be denounced, and contingent proprietary right to 
land and serfdom will cease to be equal institutions. 
Let us identify what factors supported the tacit contract. Landowners will 
be more interested in maintaining the contract, if the area of ploughed fields 
and grain prices are increasing. In this case, they get an opportunity to multi-
ply their profit; hence, they are more encouraged to maintain the contract. 
High costs of military service (the obligation to take part in campaigns, 
equipping themselves and servants), on the contrary, are poor incentives: if 
the costs are too big, they can outweigh the monopsony profit of the land-
owner generated from the allocated land. Finally, there is a system of repres-
sive measures and non-economic costs for evaders and traitors (reputation, 
moral and religious repercussions): if the punishment for apostasy is sub-
stantial and very probable, incentives to maintaining the contract increase 
and persist, even when the monopsony income of the landowner generated 
by serfs is not very high2. 
Another interest of the supreme ruler is the formation of a large and ef-
fective army. Thus, he is interested in manorial tenure: in this case, the ruler 
gets an opportunity to form a large army rapidly without spending personal 
and public funds, since landowners take on the obligation to serve through 
accepting their lands. The incentives for maintaining manorial tenure in-
crease when the contribution of decentralised factors (landowner regimenta-
tion, cavalry) into the defence potential is considerable. And, vice versa, as 
military profession develops and the significance of centralised factors (artil-
lery, regiments of the “new order”) increases — when the strength of the army 
becomes less important than its infrastructure, training, and discipline, — the 
incentives for the supreme ruler to maintain the social contract decrease. 
Now let us focus on how the features of the institutional choice of Mus-
covy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth can be interpreted from the 
perspective of this approach. 
 
Land ownership and the establishment of serfdom in Muscovy 
 
The 16th century divides Russian history into two completely different 
parts — the feudal and Moscovian, which were characterised, inter alia, by 
the opposite types of land relations — patrimonial and manorial land tenure. 
It is the 15th century, when the institution of contingent manorial land tenure 
                                                     
2 A more detailed analysis of incentives for landowners and the supreme ruler to 
maintain the social contract in Muscovy is given in [3]. 
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gained grounds, which formed the bases of the military and service class or-
ganisation of Muscovy. This watershed is manifested in the wills of Moscow 
princes. Dmitry of the Don guaranteed his boyars the rights to their land and 
acknowledges them as absolute owners (14th century): 
 
…with your assistance strengthened I the grand duchy, and brought 
peace and quiet, and kept the land of my fathers… and I did not do evil to any 
of you, nor took anything away by force, nor offended you, nor plundered, 
not disorder… thus, I call you not the boyars, but the princes of my land [4, 
p. 398]. 
 
However, just two centuries later, Ivan the Terrible writes in his letter to 
the Polish king Sigismund Augustus in his peculiar manner about the chan-
ges that had taken place in Muscovy: 
 
…our unfettered stardom of great sovereigns is not like your pitiful king-
dom; our great sovereigns are never instructed by anyone, but your lords or-
der you as they please… our sovereigns are autocrats and no one can order 
them, and they are free to pardon or execute [4, p. 408]. 
 
The manorial systems suddenly emerged in Muscovy under Ivan III at 
the end of the 15th century and started to develop rapidly [5]. The establish-
ment of manorial system is explained by contemporaries and historians by 
taking after the Ottoman Empire [6; 7], and the period of development of 
Muscovy in the 15th century was the time of adopting Turkish ways and 
transforming Russia according to the Ottoman model [8]. 
The final formation of the manorial system under Ivan the Terrible, 
when the order and principle of cavalry, recruit, and arms services provided 
by lands were settled, gave rise to the formation of one of the largest armies 
of the time, which could be compared only to the sultan’s army. As contem-
poraries reported, whereas earlier, the army of the Moscow tsar was rather 
small, under Ivan the Terrible, when each nobleman could bring one or two 
“fighting serfs”, it reached the strength of 80,000 people and, according to 
some accounts (which can be exaggerated), there were two armies of 
100,000 people each [9; 10]. So, the task of increasing the military potential 
was solved, and Muscovy safeguarded its sovereignty and got an opportunity 
to further territorial expansion. In the conditions of significant influence of 
decentralised factors on defence potential, the supreme ruler was especially 
interested in the formation of a large manorial army and, as a result, had suf-
ficient incentives to maintain the “land for service” social contract. 
There were equal incentives for landowners to maintain the tacit con-
tract. Firstly, it was them who were granted new manors as a result of mili-
tary campaigns and territorial expansion in the 16th century. The establish-
ment of serfdom was necessary to eliminate the competition between landlords 
for peasants in the conditions of the territorial expansion and prevent peasant 
escapes. This conclusion corresponds to E. Domar’s hypothesis about the im-
pact of land surplus on the development of serfdom in Russia [11]. 
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Secondly, the principle of the army formation was established from as 
early as Ivan the Terrible’s services code: a landowner had to provide one 
soldier from each 150 dessiatinas3 of land and be present at the inspection 
with horses, people, and arms. It is worth noting that the obligations of a 
landowner depended on the area of land he possessed, which settled the costs 
of military services and ensured that the social contract was maintained. 
Finally, in the 16th century, the evasion of service started to be consid-
ered not as a simple refusal to conclude a contract between a free and inde-
pendent landowner and the supreme ruler, but as treason. The punishment 
for apostasy (confiscation of property, plunder of the manor) could be an 
important incentive to maintain the social contract, which was supplemented 
by different kinds of non-economic coercion. It could result in significant 
reputation costs for the landowner, which kept him from violating the “land 
for service” agreement. So, when entering the service of the Moscow king, 
the contract was supposed to be reinforced by kissing the cross and guaran-
tees from a metropolitan and people in service. The ones who wanted to 
leave this “cartel”, would face both religious punishment and the breach of 
relations with the “colleagues”. 
The establishment of such a system in Muscovy was probably inter-
preted as (and actually was) the best decision in the struggle for sovereignty 
and safety of residents. However, one should not consider the Ottoman alter-
native the only one available at the time. Muscovy also interacted with other 
states and could consider as an alternative to the “authority-property” institu-
tion the institution of private property, which gained grounds in Livonia and 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The reason for the variant being re-
jected might have been confessional tensions, since the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania was a Catholic state and, from the perspective of Moscow princes 
was an opponent to orthodoxy [12]. At the same time, the military advan-
tages of the Turkish model were so obvious that one could easily ignore that 
it was adopted from “pagans”. 
 
Serfdom 2.0 in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
(the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania) 
 
The case of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth shows that there were 
alternative paths of institutional development. Unlike Muscovy, an increase 
in feudal land tenure in this region related to the reinforcement of owner’s 
rights and the development of vested property rights. The lack of strong cen-
tral authority contributed to the strengthening of knighthood. As a result of 
weak central authority, the social contract could not be maintained by effi-
cient enforcement from the state. Contingent property rights did not gain 
such vast grounds in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as in Muscovy. 
Large vassals managed to secure privileged rights to fief, which ensured the 
patrimonial right to the land. 
                                                     
3 Translator’s note: an obsolete Russian measure of land, roughly 1.1 hectares. 
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Against the background of the development of vested land right regime, 
peasants are turned to surfs. It was a variation of the Roman slavery system, 
and economy acquires market and export character not unlike that of the 
Southern United States. As early as the 1530s — 1540s, the price revolution 
taking place in Western Europe (increase in the prices for bread, flax, hemp, 
cattle) resulted in the development of the corvee labour system of feudal 
economy. Feudal lords use the external factor, adding to their income gener-
ated through in-kind and monetary inflows from peasants, income from 
manors, and export of grain to England and Holland. The structure of manor 
incomes started to be dominated not by income from peasants (agricultural 
products and money), but that from the manor itself. At the same time, grain 
accounted for 70—90 % of the manor income; and 40—50 % of the harvest 
yielded by large manors was exported. The trend towards the strengthening 
of corvee and serfdom was most pronounced in the regions in the vicinity of 
floatable rivers: the location in proximity to export ports (Narva, Tallinn, 
Pärnu, Riga) and the convenience of water and land freight was an additional 
incentive for landowners [13]. 
The high bread prices and serfdom scenario was characteristic of many 
countries of Eastern Europe (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Bohe-
mia, Prussia, Pomerania). Unlike the Moscovite serfdom, the market and 
private property institutions were rather widespread there, and the revival of 
serfdom in these countries is explained traditionally by the growing demand 
for bread [14]. The reinforcement of serfdom was manifested in the aspira-
tion of feudal lords to eliminate the peasant’s right to leave manors and find 
ways to prevent escapes. However, unlike other states (for instance, Mus-
covy), where the strong central authority took care of the interests of the no-
bility, legislation on peasant escapees turned into territorial intraclass agree-
ments (for example, "einigungen" in Livonia). The struggle for peasants be-
tween landowners escalated in the periods of plunders, for instance, in the 
course of the Livonian War. Thus, feudal lords concluded private contracts, 
taking on the obligation not to entice someone else’s serfs and return them to 
the owner in case they come of their own accord. So, the need for the forced 
return of escapees resulted in the establishment of a special police and judi-
cial mechanism of Hackengerichts, which, nevertheless, were of a local ra-
ther than nationwide nature [15]. 
So, under the influence of external factors (high prices for exported 
grain), the landowners of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth managed to 
establish a monopsony in the labour market without the interference of the 
state and conclusion of a social contract, which resulted in the emergence of 
serfdom 2.0. It substantiated the above mentioned idea that, against the 
background of rising prices the product of labour, the profit of a monopson-
ist increases alongside the incentives for landowners to establish serfdom. At 
the same time, the absence of strong state authority was an obstacle to a 
change in the land right regime towards contingent rights. The nobility and 
gentry, as the dominant political force, were interested in securing their lands 
and could generate a monopsony profit through reviving serfdom without 
involving the state. 
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Competition between institutions and the consequences  
of the institutional choice 
 
The comparative analysis of development of land tenure rights and the 
reasons for the emergence of serfdom makes it possible to identify the key 
factors of maintaining the “land for service” social contract and explain the 
features of the institution development in Muscovy and the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth (table). 
 
The significance of factors affecting the maintenance  
of the “land for service” social contract 
 
The “land for service” social 
contract is maintained 
(contingent land  
rights + serfdom) 
Social contract  
is not maintained  
(only serfdom) Factor 
Muscovy Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
Resource allotment (availability 
of unoccupied lands for allo-
cating in exchange for service)  
+ — 
Strong central authority + — 
The development of a strata inte-
rested in vested property rights  — + 
Export-oriented production (grain) — + 
Considerable contribution of de-




The historical consequences of the institutional choice in the states under 
consideration are neither easily predictable, nor logical. The case of the Po-
lish-Lithuanian Commonwealth shows that the spread of “good” institutions 
of vested land rights ensuring the protection of property rights and incentives 
to investment is not the only and sufficient factor of long-term economic de-
velopment. 
The weakness of state authority results in the division of the history of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in two stages: the “golden age” of 
Polish nobility following the signing of the Union of Lublin in 1569 (the es-
tablishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and a series of mili-
tary defeats in the 17th century (by Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s Cossacks, the 
Swedish Deluge) and resulting in three divisions of Poland in the late 18th 
century and the fall of the empire. The predominance of export-oriented ag-
riculture and the establishment of serfdom allowed the nobility to generate 
monopsonic income, which was directed to internal consumption (for exam-
ple, luxury goods). Unlike Muscovy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
M. S. Vdovin 
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did not maintain a social contract between the supreme ruler and landow-
ners. In the field of politics, the nobility pursued narrow intraclass interests, 
focused on solving local problems, which made it possible to increase per-
sonal income, rather than state affairs, first of all, the defence potential. 
By the mid-17th century, after a series of heavy defeats, the military inef-
ficiency of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility becomes evident. The Polish ca-
valry and the famous Polish “winged” hussars could hardly meet the new 
warfare conditions — sieges and attacks of musket-armed infantry. The lack 
of strong central authority, when the king “reigned but not ruled” and the 
nobility was convinced of stability of their financial and political freedoms, 
resulted in the crown not having enough funds for army reforms [16]. In the 
conditions, when the neighbouring absolute monarchies conducted active 
army modernisation (for example, the Swedish king Karl Gustav, having un-
derstood that the Polish cavalry is not to be defeated by being outnumbered, 
focused on improving discipline and developing artillery), Poland had nei-
ther financial, nor political resources to reform its army. As a result, by the 
end of 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to be an 
independent state and turned from one of the largest states of Europe into an 
object of territorial division carried out by stronger neighbours. 
The Moscow State found itself caught in a similar trap in the 17th cen-
tury. Reformation (the abandonment of the social contract) would have 
meant a sharp decrease in the defence potential, thus it could not be con-
ducted at once and over a short period. On the other hand, as the contribution 
of centralised factors in the defence potentiation increases, the weaknesses of 
landowner army become evident. In 1610, in the battle of Klushino, the Po-
lish “winged” hussars inflicted a devastating defeat on the troops of Dmitry 
Shuisky, which were four times their strength; it was the first sign of the inef-
ficiency of the extant system and the army formed on its bases. The 1659 de-
feat at Konotop resulted in such a heavy toll that the landowner army lost its 
earlier significance forever. 
However, Muscovy (and later the Russian Empire) could carry out mili-
tary modernisation through the resources of strong state authority. However, 
the rejection of the “military service for land” model was gradual and lasted 
for more than two centuries. Firstly, the regiments of the “new order” were 
created in the 1630—1670s; they were formed by non-landed gentry, who 
were paid in bread and money [16]. Secondly, after the decree of 1762, the 
nobility were exempt from obligatory military service; however, they re-
tained the rights to serf ownership. Although military service was voluntary, 
it still involved most of the nobility and gentry, since it was a source of fi-
nancing alongside the income from serfs. And the final reform was intro-
duced after the major crisis of the system — the defeat in the Crimean War 
in the 19th century, which was a result of the technical backwardness of the 
Russian army. As the contribution of decentralised factors into the defence 
potential decreased, the maintenance of the social contract by the tsar 
seemed less and less probable, but the defeat in the Crimean War was the fi-
nal incentive to terminate the social contract and abolish serfdom. 





The history of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth — 
two states that took different paths of institutional development — shows 
that, according to the NIEH approach, economic institutions are formed un-
der the influence of different external factors and affect their future eco-
nomic and political development. 
At the same time, the historical analysis demonstrates that the institu-
tions considered “bad” and ineffective from the perspective of economic the-
ory, can turn out to be competitive under certain historical conditions. For 
example, the contingent proprietary rights in Muscovy, despite their evident 
negative impact on the economic sphere, become competitive in the condi-
tions of significant contribution of decentralised factors in the defence poten-
tial and ensure the formation of a large and efficient army. On the other 
hand, against the background of a weak state authority, the vested right regi-
me characteristic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth allows certain in-
terest groups — the nobility — to maximise their income, but cannot support 
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